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Ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that the best explanation for a large share
of cognition is non-representational in kind. In both ecological psychology and enactivist
philosophy, then, the task is to offer an explanans that does not rely on representations.
Different theorists within these camps have contrasting notions of what the best kind
of non-representational explanation will look like, yet they agree on one central point:
instead of focusing solely on factors interior to an agent, an important aspect of cognition
is found in the link or coupling between an agent and the external world. This link is fluid,
dynamic, and active in a variety of ways, and we do not need to add any internal extra
something in the perception-action-cognition process. At the same time, even devout
defenders of ecological psychology and enactivism recognize that plenty happens inside
an agent during cognition. In particular, no one denies that the brain plays an important
role. What, then, is the role of the brain if it’s not in the game of representing the
environment? One possible option is to describe the brain as a resonant organ instead
of a representational organ. In this paper we consider the history of resonance in more
detail. Particular focus will be placed on two different sets of approaches that have
developed the concept of resonance: a representational reading of resonance and a
non-representational, dynamic account of resonance. We then apply these accounts
to a case study on music performance, specifically in the context of standard tonal
jazz. From this application, we propose that a non-representational resonance account
consistent with both enactivism and ecological psychology is a viable way of explaining
jazz performance. We conclude with future considerations on research regarding the
brain as a resonant organ.
Keywords: resonance, enactivism, ecological psychology, jazz performance, improvisation
INTRODUCTION
Orthodox ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that the best explanation for a large share of
cognition is non-representational in kind. Such antirepresentational sentiments are noted explicitly
by Claire Michaels and Zsolt Palatinus in their 9th commandment of ecological psychology: “thou
shalt not make unto thee any mental image or likeness of anything” (2011, p. 25, emphasis added).
In the enactivist church, Hutto and Myin (2017) are among the high-priests who declare it a
mortal offense to espouse representations (also see Varela et al., 1991; Gallagher, 2017). On such
views, mental representations are abstractions that do no real explanatory work. In both ecological
psychology and enactivist philosophy, then, the task is to offer an explanans that does not rely
on representations.
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Different theorists within these camps have contrasting
notions of what the best kind of non-representational explanation
will look like. They nevertheless all agree on one central point:
instead of focusing solely on factors interior to an agent, a good
part of cognition is to be found in the link or coupling between
an agent and the external world. This link is fluid, dynamic, and
active in a variety of ways. Thus, the well-situated agent will
pick up invariant information from the environment or engage
with its world – either by choice (in the case of self-driven
actions) or attraction (when something from the environment
solicits and/or grabs the agent’s attention) – which will in turn
drive iterant loops of perception, action, and cognition. One
likewise does not need to add an internal extra something in the
perception-action-cognition process.
At the same time, even devout defenders of ecological
psychology and enactivism recognize that plenty happens inside
an agent during cognition. Furthermore, although a full,
embodied story will require taking into account many bodily
and affective aspects of cognition (Colombetti, 2014), including
even activity in the gut guiding behavior both in concert and
independently from brain activity (Davidson et al., 2018; Liang
et al., 2018), no one denies that the brain plays an important
role. What, then, is the role of the brain if it’s not in the game
of representing the environment?
One possible option is to describe the brain as a resonant
organ instead of a representational organ. In what follows, we
begin (in Section “RESONANCE: METAPHOR, MECHANISM,
OR SOMETHING ELSE?”) by considering some of the history
of resonance, especially in contact with the work of James J.
Gibson, in more detail. Particular focus will be placed on two
different sets of approaches that have developed the concept of
resonance: (1) a representational reading of resonance and (2)
a non-representational, dynamic account of resonance. Section
“RESONANCE IN MUSIC PERFORMANCE” then applies these
accounts to a case study on music performance, specifically in
standard tonal jazz improvisation. We then conclude the paper
with future considerations on research regarding the brain as
a resonant organ.
RESONANCE: METAPHOR,
MECHANISM, OR SOMETHING ELSE?
While the concept of resonance has played a role in the ecological
psychology literature for over 50 years, it remains theoretically
underdeveloped (cf. Raja, 2018, 2019). The idea that the brain
resonates with the world instead of representing it first appeared
in James J. Gibson’s work on perception and the senses. In
Gibson’s words (1966):
Instead of supposing that the brain constructs or computes the
objective information from a kaleidoscopic inflow of sensations,
we may suppose the orienting of the organs of perception is
governed by the brain so that the whole system of input and
output resonates to the external information. (p. 5).
To understand the notion of resonance, following Shepard
(1984), we can consider the case of how a piano resonates
with external sounds as a prototype example of a resonant
system. Assume you have a guitar and are standing near a
piano. You pluck an open C-string and the piano strings will
shortly start vibrating in resonance with the soundwaves in the
air. But the piano’s C-strings will not be the only ones that
vibrate in response to the original guitar note. Other strings
with various harmonic relationships to C will, at the same time,
become excited and start to vibrate as well, defined by specific
constraints: “Resonators respond differently to the same stimuli,
depending on their tuning” (Shepard, 1984, 433). There will
also be amplification and resonance of the strings happening
as a result of being inside an instrument. Indeed, there can
be a variety of “modes of resonance” that occur in response
to complex stimuli, such as an entire chord being strummed
instead of an individual note (a point further discussed in Section
“Representational Resonance”). We will return to this example in
various parts of this paper.
While the relationship between resonance and instruments
is clear, one may wonder if there is any coherent way to
make sense of the idea that brains and neurons resonate in
similar ways to musical instruments. Neurons, after all, are
not strings or hollow tubes; they don’t literally vibrate. They
do however come to be involved in patterns of oscillation,
firing in dynamical connection with other neurons or groups
of neurons. Varela (1996), for example, had proposed a role for
transient spatiotemporal patterns of synchronous neural activity
in explaining cognitive events.
For example, one resonant assembly could transiently bind
together the different populations of neurons involved in
analyzing the shape, color, and motion of a visual object, and this
temporary assembly would constitute a neural substrate for the
transient perception of a visual object. (Cosmelli et al., 2007, 737)
In their review article “Resonance, oscillation and the intrinsic
frequency preferences of neurons,” Hutcheon and Yarom, 2000
explore the link between different brain rhythms and different
perceptual and/or behavioral states. In their words, “A series
of firmly established empirical associations with the behavioral
states of organisms provides compelling evidence that brain
rhythms reflect basic modes of dynamical organization in
the brain” (2000, 216). Further developments in the field
have helped establish that these resonance processes, especially
insofar as they are phylogenetically preserved, may serve
some functionally relevant role (Buzsaki and Draguhn, 2004).
Similarly, the development of Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART)
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 2010; Grossberg, 2013) has attempted
to bring together these neuroscientific findings into a general
cognitive theory1.
It is not clear that the concept of resonance in the brain
is entirely captured by the notion of neural oscillations and
rhythms, however. Sometimes the notion of resonance has been
invoked in social cognition as two agents resonating with each
other. One mechanism for this social sense of resonance is
the mirror neuron system, which activates both when an agent
1Raja (2019) briefly considers and rejects ART as an acceptable gloss of Gibson’s
notion of resonance because of its representational baggage.
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performs an action, such as grasping a ball, and when that
agent sees a conspecific performing the same action (Rizzolatti
et al., 1996). Resonance within the brain in this case involves a
neural system being activated by (or being sent into an oscillating
pattern by) a bodily or environmental event. Other times
resonance is even more metaphorical and is simply equivalent to
general neural processing in response to the environment.
Considering these several distinct notions of resonance,
the musical instrument example does not capture everything
essential in the concept. Gibson, for example, further clarifies
a possible passive misreading of resonance by noting that “The
‘resonating’ or ‘tuning’ of a system suggests the analogy of a radio
receiver. This model is inadequate because there would have to
be a little man to twiddle the knobs. A perceiver is a self -tuning
system” (1966, p. 271, emphasis in original). The ability to self-
tune is essential for making clear that, unlike passive systems
or artifacts, cognitive resonance is not just something that the
external world forces onto the organism. Indeed, sometimes
resonance can occur without standard environmental inputs,
such as during dreams or hallucinations. Such cases provide
support to Gibson’s idea that there is an essential aspect of
self-tuning involved in the system. Accordingly, embracing the
idea of the brain as a resonant organ does not presuppose
that the brain is a passive organ, since certain aspects of
enactive resonance are not always themselves a passive process
of information pick-up. Inhibitory processes can intervene,
and the brain can activate in anticipation of some possible
experience or activity.
For our immediate purposes, besides establishing a role for
neurons resonating with each other, self-tuning may be best
understood along with the idea that the brain is never isolated
from the body or environment, and it always operates within this
larger system to some degree. Accordingly, past experiences can
set up the parameters of the resonance processes that will shape
ongoing experience of the environment, which may, in turn, re-
attune resonance processes. In cases of perception and action,
the connection between organism and world will be a direct
dynamical coupling. In cases of imagination or hallucination, the
connection may not be one of direct coupling, but the patterns
at play will still, to some degree, bear the mark (be similar to,
or reactivate) some of the previous connections between agent
and environment that correlated with perception and action in
the first place (see, e.g., Lotze et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2012).
The move to highlight a self-tuning aspect to resonance alone
does not solve a related issue about the nature of agency in
resonance. Put succinctly, if the central claim of resonance is that
all the brain is doing is resonating with ecological information,
then it is not clear why any additional processing should occur
inside the organism. Yet some of the choices made by an agent
extend beyond information available in the environment. There
is thus, it seems, a need for internal processing that cannot be
explained solely by appeal to resonance. If we were working on
the idea that resonance is a metaphor, then this result might
be rather benign. However, all of the main theorists we will be
discussing – Vicente Raja, Thomas Fuchs, and Roger Shepard –
agree that resonance is a material process rather than a mere
metaphor. As a result, in exploring their respective approaches,
we need to ask what is the best way to understand this relevant
additional internal processing?
To achieve this goal, the remainder of this section
is broken into two subsections. The first considers a
representational reading of resonance. The second considers
a non-representational alternative, which we shall refer to
interchangeably as a dynamic reading of resonance. Since these
sections will serve as the introduction to various takes on
resonance, most of the critical work that has been leveled against
them will be reserved for later sections of the paper.
Representational Resonance
A main and early proponent of the representational account of
resonance is Shepard (1981, 1982, 1984). Some of his ideas on
the topic were briefly introduced in the above case of the piano
resonating with the guitar. A few more need to be added to
give a complete sense of his account. In particular we need to
consider the notion of a complex nesting of resonance within a
cognitive hierarchy and the notion of complementarity instead of
isomorphism between resonating systems (Shepard, 1984).
Since we have moved from mere metaphor to a material
process, we likewise need to consider how resonance may be
physically realized in a particular system such as the brain.
Shepard (1984, 433) flags three upshots of resonant systems that
will have implications for the use of this concept in cognitive
science. First, resonant systems will have constraints that are
shaped both by what is being tuned and how it is tuned. Second,
there are multiple ways to excite a resonant system. Third, and
in relation to the second point, there are different modes of
excitation in a resonant system.
We can see these three elements in play by returning to the
case of the piano as a resonant system (Shepard, 1984, 433-4;
also see Raja, 2019 for different musical instrument examples).
In regard to the first point, the harmonics that a piano resonates
at will be impacted by how the strings have been tuned. The
resulting sounds will simultaneously have a particular timbre
that is shaped by various physical features of the piano, in
contrast to the physical characteristics of a guitar, sax, flute,
drums, etc. A similar relationship holds in the case of neurons,
where some elements of their resonance patterns will be shaped
by how they have been “tuned” over a lifetime of engaging
with the environment, while others – such as theta, beta, or
gamma brainwaves – are inherent to their nature and place in
brain architecture.
In regard to the second point, the activation of strings can
occur from various different signals and sources, including but
not limited to soundwaves that are strong and identical to a given
tuning. For instance, in addition to matching tones, resonance
could be realized by sounds that are harmonically related, sources
from incomplete tones, or sounds with variable energy and force.
Finally, for the third point, activation of a piano is not achieved
only by the strings resonating with external sounds. It may also
be activated by playing other notes or chords on the piano itself,
as well as plucking or striking the string directly by hand.
There are several limitations with a piano as our guiding
example, in addition to those canvased above, namely the piano
is not able to be self-tuning nor begin playing on its own accord.
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Not even a sophisticated pianola would entirely solve these
problems. As such, we now turn to address this point through
the role of a complex agential hierarchy in place for an organism
but not for an inanimate object.
Shepard (1984) notes that it is important to conceptualize
the various resonant modes as organized hierarchically within
the system. When combined with endogenous and exogenous
sources of excitation, this hierarchical system is able to pick
out or represent the complex web of perceptual invariants in
the environment. Sometimes it does so by moving up or down
levels, perhaps focusing on high-level, general kinds (e.g., one
hierarchical organization represents the sound of a doorbell)
or low-level, more specific features (e.g., a lower-level part of
that hierarchy represents a specific pitch regardless of timbre, or
perhaps another hierarchical organization represents my parent’s
doorbell instead of doorbells in general). Other times a higher
level may resonate directly without requiring the excitation of
lower levels of the system, such as if we are simply thinking about
or imagining a doorbell ringing. As a result, Shepard suggests
that these internally and externally driven sources of resonance
are consistent with the idea that perception is “externally guided
hallucination,” a claim that has since become part of predictive
processing accounts of perception and action (Clark, 2013, 2016).
This view of perception as “externally guided hallucination”
presupposes a view of the brain as more than just mirroring
the external world. Shepard here suggests that some aspects of
the brain are not directly resonating with the outside world,
especially in cases of non-ideal perceptual environments. Instead
of direct perception, the brain is “sympathetically excited” by
purely internal activities (1984, 436). Understanding perception
as a subset of hallucination, heavily subsidized by internal
processes of imagination, is a view rejected by the dynamical
approaches to resonance that we consider in the next section.
Shepard’s account furthermore puts pressure on the role of
resonance as a kind of isomorphic mirroring between agent
and environment. He suggests that it is better to think of the
resonance between brain and world as a case of complementarity
patterns. For instance, consider one of Shepard’s favorite
examples of a key and a corresponding lock. There is a direct
correspondence between a key and the lock and it is a necessary
condition for the proper functioning of the locking system.
However, we would be hard pressed to say that the key is
isomorphic to the lock. Instead of matching, this relation between
key and lock is complementary; the key complements the lock in
the right sort of way to unlock or lock the door. We will return to
Shepard’s account again through the work of Charles Nussbaum
in considering musical performance below and the idea of
complimentary will play a central role in that context as well.
One may be tempted to claim here that moving away from
isomorphism may itself be a move away from a representational
account. Complementarity, however, may still characterize
representational function insofar as it meets what Ramsey
(2007) has called “the job description challenge,” where the
mark of representational processes is that they serve an explicit
representational function. Consider the case of perception in
ambiguous or non-ideal perceptual situations. In these cases,
it is important that the brain can complement the available
information with its own productions rather than simply pick
up information and react. Insofar as some self-tuning patterns
of resonance can be stimulated and maintained by various parts
of the brain, they can stand in for missing aspects of external
stimuli, supplementing when the stimulus is too impoverished.
This stand-in may occur in a manner that addresses the job
description challenge.
Shepard (1975) himself explicitly notes the representational
components of his theory in several papers (1975, 1984). The
sorts of representations he has in mind here are often centered
on mental imagery. Thus, in his words, “I conjecture that Gibson
disavowed the term mental image because he could not imagine
what sort of thing a mental image could be. . .However, in
neglecting the representation of objects and events that are not
physically present, Gibson seems to have given up too much”
(1984, 420, emphasis in original). Shepard further cites evidence
for similar durations for mental image rotation across perception
and imagination to suggest that an agent must be working with
a representation of an external object during imagination, when
the object isn’t actually present.
This notion of mental imagery in Shepard can further be
thought of as representational insofar as it lines up with recent
notions of structural representations. Following Piccinini (2018),
this kind of representation includes (2018, 3):
(1) A homomorphism (partial isomorphism) between a system
of internal states and their target,
(2) A causal connection from the target to the internal states,
(3) The possibility for the internal states to be decoupled from
their target, and
(4) A role in action control.
All four of these features are indicative of Shepard’s account.
In addition, following Ramsey (2007), Chap (6), it seems that
structural representations at least prima facie qualify as satisfying
the job description challenge.2
Dynamic Resonance
We will now introduce two alternative approaches to resonance
from enactivist and ecological psychology backgrounds. When
looking at points of similarity between these two non-
representationalist camps, we shall refer to them collectively as
constituting a dynamic notion of resonance.3
Thomas Fuchs, like Shepard and Gibson, highlights the fact
that the notion of resonance comes from considerations about
acoustics and oscillations. He further draws out the acoustic
language to a different metaphor of the brain as taking part
in jazz improvisation. In Fuchs’ words, “the brain is not the
conductor of the body; rather, it is like a musician in a group
of jazz musicians jointly improvising on the basis of certain
chords” (2018, p. 134). This is similar to Gibson (1979/2014)
2While we are accepting that this move may be enough to distinguish Shepard’s
account as representational, there have been arguments against the idea that
structural representations are best understood as types of representations in the
first place (cf. Segundo-Ortin and Hutto, 2019).
3On one hand, one could say that Shepard also took a dynamical approach to
cognition. On the other hand, insofar as representations are often offered as
a stand-in for more dynamical kinds of explanations, we believe that the use
of dynamical explanations here captures something importantly different from
representationalists yet similar between enactivists and ecological psychologists.
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motto “behavior is regular without being regulated” (1979/2014,
p. 215)4. This improvising jazz picture can be contrasted to
traditional cognitivist assumptions that neatly partition sensory
input/brain processes/action output and treat the brain as a
conductor. For cognitivists, the brain may be part of the body (as
a conductor is part of the orchestra) yet it is essentially distinct
from more strictly embodied activities and, instead, plays its
main role in guiding our actions in response to our sensations
(reflected in an understanding of the conductor somehow playing
the orchestra as their “instrument”).
In contrast to cognitivism, a dynamical account takes as an
important insight that, while the brain plays some essential and
likely unique role in cognition, (1) it is not in the business of
controlling the entire process of cognition, (2) it is necessarily
and inextricably responsive to various aspects of the overall
cognitive system in deep and consistent ways, and (3) it cannot
be understood in isolation from other processes happening across
the body and environment. Even the soloist in a jazz band is
similarly bound by these sorts of constraints, assuming that the
band is structured more around improvisation and less around
playing composed music.
Fuchs suggests that the acoustical focus likewise brings
the essentially temporal nature of cognition to the fore. As a
result, in his words, “Resonance contains a dynamical as well as a
rhythmical element and thus establishes a temporally overarching
relation between the systems involved. . .’resonandum’
and ‘resonans’ thus cannot be separated” (2018, p. 166).
Such inseparability is furthermore taken as a sign that the
explanation of resonance, and of the brain in general, cannot be
representational in nature; a representational account, if nothing
else, must at least allow for some form of decouplability between
the initial representational vehicle and its representational
content (Gallagher, 2017, Chap. 5). In contrast, the relata in
resonance in some way need to remain coupled for resonance to
work: brain-body, organism-environment, you-me, etc.
Resonance can be found in two intersections, according to
Fuchs. First, the brain and body resonate with each other
in a dynamical, intertwined, circular process that involves
homeostasis. Damasio (2010, 21) calls this a ‘resonant loop’. This
brain-body resonance is tied into the fact that the brain is “the
‘integral’ of the overarching process of life which encompasses
the whole organism” (Fuchs, 2018, 119, emphasis in original).
From the level of densely interconnected brain activity across the
brainstem and cortex, to the role of affect as essential to cognitive
activity, and out further still to the densely intertwined efferent
and afferent feedback between the brain and non-neural body,
changes in one locus will reverberate and resonate with all other
areas in the system.
Second, there is a resonance between an organism and
the environment. This particular resonance occurs through a
“dynamic set of isomorphic patterns” that develop between the
brain, body, and world. An example of isomorphic resonant
patterns would be when a specific (or similar) brain pattern
occurs in response to the presence of a specific (or similar)
environmental context. Moreover, neural evidence has shown
that brain patterns change in response to learning new habits and
4Thanks to a reviewer for highlighting this more direct connection to Gibson.
skills, such as the increase in musical ability resulting in different
neural activations compared to novices first learning how to play
(Oechslin et al., 2013). Such results suggest that the dynamics
of these isomorphic patterns are skill dependent on experience
instead of arriving hardwired ahead of time. Fuchs’ emphasis on
the isomorphic quality of resonance is tied to his endorsement
of an Aristotelian formulation of intentionality, where the mind
takes on the form (eidos or morphe) of the perceived object
(Fuchs, 2018, 166ff).
If resonance occurs across brain, body and environment,
however, then distinguishing two sorts of resonance is not
enough to provide the complete story. While multiple types and
scales of resonance will be essential to understanding what it
means for the brain to be a resonant organ, these can be further
parsed out to give a more detailed sense of exactly how all of
them are ordered. According to Vicente Raja (2018, 33), there
are three possible target scales for resonance: (1) the agent-CNS
(Central Nervous System) interaction, i.e., “the CNS activity in
relation with the overall activity of the agent in her environment,”
(2) body- or inner-CNS interaction, and (3) CNS-environment
interaction. While Fuchs considers resonance across these scales,
he does so without marking them in these terms. Keeping
them together is ultimately important for the overall account of
dynamic resonance. Yet distinguishing them is equally important
since it makes the contours of how different kinds of resonance
relate to each other clearer than they would be otherwise.
The inner-CNS scale, which would narrowly track the first
resonance presented by Fuchs, involves an important form
of resonance between the CNS and other parts of the body,
no doubt. The problem with placing a focus solely on this
level to understand perception and/or action is that the inner-
CNS scale fails to track variables at the ecological level, which
are needed for the complete brain-body-world explanation of
perception and action.
The CNS-environment scale, in contrast, fails to account for
important ways that an agent is able to modulate and alter
their interactions with the environment. More specifically, on
this scale, the focus would move directly between activity of the
CNS and the environment, without taking consideration of the
peripheral nervous system or bodily affects. And even though the
agent may not have complete control over their relationship to
the environment, there is more endogenous processing going on
outside of the CNS itself.
At the agent-CNS scale, which Raja takes to be the correct
target for explanation, the focus is how activity of the CNS
resonates with the organized activity of an agent within her
environment. This scale necessarily requires drawing on the full
suite of intra-organism resonances (e.g., intraneural resonance
among different neurons and brain regions coupled with
homeostatic resonance between the brain, heart, stomach, and
lungs), including those under agential control and those outside
of it, and the resonances between the embodied agent and her
environment. This scale is also equivalent to a full integration of
the two resonances described by Fuchs.
Raja further develops the notion of dynamic resonance
by first appealing to Michael Anderson’s account of “neural
reuse” for an account of resonance in the brain and, second,
Dynamical Systems Theory for an account of ecological, i.e.,
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organism-environment, resonance. According to Raja, these are
compatible theories, with structural and theoretical parallels.
Neural reuse allows for a rich flexibility and sensitivity in
patterns of functional connectivity to the demands of different
cognitive tasks, consistent with the notion that neural resonance
may change as an adjustment to different goals and tasks. As
Raja notes, the idea of neural reuse is precisely expressed by
Gibson in an unpublished manuscript: “a given set of neurons
is equipotential for various different functions in perception and
behavior. The same neuron may be excited for different uses at
different times. [Accordingly] neurons, nerves, and parts of the
brain have a vicarious function. A nerve cell is not the same
unit in a different combination of nerve cells” (cited in Reed,
1988, p. 224).
According to proponents of neural reuse, different conjuncts
of brain areas will be dynamically (re)configured as functional
units depending on the task, setting up a specialized resonance
in response to particular cognitive demands. The additional
dynamic coupling between the brain understood as a resonant
organ founded on neural reuse, on one hand, and the
environment, on the other, is defined in relation to a common
ecological variable that constrains the actions of the agent.
Accordingly, we are able to say that the intra-organism system
(i.e., the agent) as one system resonates dynamically with the
environment in order to engage with the world. For Raja, these
two systems integrate, via resonance, to form one overarching
dynamical system. While there are cases of linear coupling
between different (sub)systems in cognition, the vast majority
of cases involve non-linear coupling [a concept also embraced
by Fuchs (2018, 223)], which would imply some constraints
on any isomorphic resonance). Non-linear cases are marked by
an interdependency between the two (or more) systems under
consideration (Van Gelder, 1995). Such non-linear coupling may
be read in line with a shift from understanding the cognitive
system as an agent connected with the environment to, instead,
focusing our cognitive explanation on the organism-environment
as itself a single relational cognitive system. Indeed, such shifts
are important for moving past the internalism/externalism
dichotomy that plagues traditional accounts of cognition.
Raja postulates that the resonance between these two
dynamical systems is one wherein the ecological scale constrains
the intraorganism scales but not vice-versa. In his words,
“to explain resonance is to account for the coupling of the
dynamic systems at the ecological and intra-organismic scales in
terms of the ecological variable that constrains a given agent-
environment interaction” (2018, 41, emphasis in original). The
importance of this directionality comes from a core commitment
of ecological psychology to the idea that the environment will
play a particularly strong guiding force in organism-environment
interactions. Moreover, Raja suggests that considerations of both
biological and explanatory plausibility push toward an unequal
relationship in favor of ecological constraints on the organism
over and above any organism constraints on the environment.
At the same time, Raja has noted that information at the
ecological scale is ultimately developed in the interplay of
organism and environment (Raja, 2020; also see Raja and
Anderson, 2019). Raja appeals to the work of William Warren on
behavioral dynamics, among others, to help clarify this interactive
process. According to Warren, the challenge of behavior is
accounting for the required mix of stability and flexibility utilized
by an agent when engaged with the world. Furthermore, in
his words, “[f]rom the agent’s point of view, the task is to
exploit physical and informational constraints to stabilize the
intended behavior” (Warren, 2006, 359, emphasis in original).
Such an exploitation is clearly an active process on the part of
the agent, which entails that the ecological variable should be
understood as including the interplay between organism and
environment as part of the process, rather than operating as a
mere external constraint.
A major point of similarity, then, between Fuchs and Raja, and
more generally between enactivists and ecological psychologists,
is the appeal to dynamical non-linear coupling between brain,
body, and world. In the case of action and perception, we should
consider the role of enabling constraints (Anderson, 2015),
where neural activity is constrained by higher-order, organism-
environment dynamics. This does not mean that brain dynamics
are passive. Rather, not only does brain activity function within
the proper constraints of organism-environment dynamics but
organism-environment dynamics are also (at least partially)
enabled by brain activity. Thus, “the brain supports on-going
behavior, to anticipate forthcoming behavior. . .. [which] allows
a healthy codetermination of action by the actor’s history and
context together with the momentary contingencies that choose
the behavior that is enacted” (Van Orden et al., 2012).5 For both
enactivism and ecological approaches, once we start looking at
resonance processes in the brain, we are immediately led to
consider the larger system of brain-body-environment.
RESONANCE IN MUSIC PERFORMANCE
Thus far we have considered the debate around resonance on
a rather abstract level. In this section, we turn to a particular
case of what happens in the brains, bodies and environments
of musicians during music performance. Although resonance
(including both acoustic and neuronal resonance) is an important
part of all different kinds of music performance, we shall
primarily focus on standard tonal jazz performance. Doing so will
help adjudicate between the various positions displayed above
and, we believe, will ultimately side in favor of a dynamical
account of resonance. As a theoretical model in its current
state, we acknowledge that our account is open to empirical
verification or falsification. We furthermore hope that it may
serve to help guide future empirical work in various aspects of
music performance and pedagogy, and developments in these
areas will loop back to further help develop our theoretical
account accordingly.
To begin, we will say a few words about standard tonal jazz
performance. When it comes to playing a jazz standard or song,
the format follows three main steps. First, the band begins by
playing the “head,” which is a statement (or implication) of the
main melodic line that demarcates the song. Second, the band
moves into the solo section. While different subgenres of jazz
embody different expectations and constraints on solo practices,
5We thank one of the journal reviewers for this reference.
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the main constraint for the standard format is harmonic in
nature: the chord changes introduced in the head are kept
consistent throughout the performance, and “correct” notes
are dictated by following this chord progression. Melodic and
rhythmic choices, in contrast, are largely left to the decision of the
performer. Third, after everyone has taken one or two choruses
to play their respective solos, the band plays the outro, which is
often a restatement of the head, and the song ends.
During an improvised performance, resonance happens on
several different levels.
• First, the individual performer resonates with the music.
This is a resonance between the sounds one creates and
the sounds in the environment (e.g., the sounds made
by other musicians). Much of this resonance will happen
at the moment of sound creation. It may be driven
by (1) consciously anticipated,6 and sometimes planned,
notes and/or (2) feedback from awareness of the sounds
that are actually created during performance. On one
hand, as the music unfolds, the performance environment
is constituted as a niche of musical affordances. The
sounds that a musician produces could thus successfully
or unsuccessfully resonate with the affordances in the
environment. On the other hand, anticipatory processes
and any short-term planning involved while playing suggest
intra-organism resonant loops constantly underlying the
performance. The combination between these respective
elements constitutes what Christensen et al. (2016) call
a “mesh” between anticipatory control, practiced/skilled
bodily movements, and the affordances presented by the
music (see Christensen and Sutton, 2019; Gallagher, in
press).
• Second, there needs to be an intersubjective and affective
resonance between an individual’s performance and the
performance of other musicians. This may be mediated by
the music itself, by conscious, non-conscious, and non-
verbal perceptual cues, or sometimes by verbal feedback
during performance (see Høffding, 2019; Høffding and
Satne, 2019).
• Third, in some cases there may also be resonance between
the musical group and the audience. Depending on the
performance context and individual musicians, this final
resonance may be as interactive and important as the earlier
kinds, act as a unidirectional constraint (e.g., the band is
shaping the audience response but the musicians have little
response to audience feedback), or rather unimportant to
the unfolding of the performance.
Such resonances may or may not be understood as
metaphorical in nature (non-metaphorical resonance may
include neural resonance; see Large (2010) for a general overview
of neural resonance in music). Either way, we decided on a
heavily improvised performance practice as our case study since
6The anticipation applies not only to the process of producing notes when the
musician is playing, but to hearing what is produced - which means that the
musician is not passively hearing, but actively listening, which is part of what
resonant self-tuning implies. In this context, for the difference between hearing
and listening, understood as intelligent and selective, see Roland Barthes (1985,
247) and for an enactive understanding of this, see Carvalho (2019).
it presents a distinct explanatory problem for resonance in the
form of a specific type of uncertainty. In musical performances
that have preexistent, thick song structures, a large part of the
cognitive work can be explained by appeal to a more stable
performance environment (through, e.g., the use of a score
or by the performance of a well-practiced song). This stable
environment may involve either strong standing mental images
of a music performance, a la Shepard, or it may provide a
clear environmental variable that constrains intra-organismic
resonance underlying action, a la Raja. Parts of these explanations
may be carried directly over into jazz performance with little
modification. Yet there is nevertheless an important difference
between improvised and composed music to the extent that the
actions of the musician are open to more immediate changes
and on the fly decisions about the music. We will call this
situation one of increased environmental uncertainty during
jazz performance.
Uncertainty here doesn’t mean that jazz performance takes
place in a poorly structured performance environment. Instead, it
is meant to highlight the fact that, in addition to the importance
of an agentive self-tuning of resonance, the performance space
and the music itself do not impose any overly strong constraint
on choices made during performance, even as they impose some
constraints. Since these constraints are extremely flexible, there
may be a worry that the invariant structures in the environment –
a core aspect of ecological explanations – are not strong enough
to stand on their own without additional internal processing of
a kind eschewed by Michaels and Palatinus (2011). A soloist
is not just a coupled oscillator resonating with patterns of
their environment, after all. They also must create improvised
choices in the moment of performance. To explain the creative
possibilities of jazz performance, it seems that we must go beyond
matching or strict isomorphic resonance to something more in
either a representational or dynamic account of resonance.
In what follows, we will not be attempting to offer a complete
account of how resonance operates during jazz performance.
We will also not be offering an argument to show that a
representational account of resonance cannot function to explain
jazz performance. We instead will consider how the two different
accounts canvased in the previous section – representational and
dynamic – each make sense of jazz performance. Furthermore,
we will also consider the limitations of a purely isomorphic
account of resonance before we consider how more details about
dynamically formed constraints between agent and environment
can answer the main concern about how dynamic accounts can
deal with the environmental uncertainty at hand.
Isomorphic Resonance
While we suggested above that isomorphism is not the way to
go, we grant that one of the simplest routes to respond to the
challenge is to insist that isomorphism is all we need to explain
musical performance. Because parsimony is an important part
of scientific theorizing, we will begin with what seems to be the
most parsimonious account of the jazz musician isomorphically
resonating with external components of the environment in
order to drive a performance forward. Indeed, after invoking
considerations of parsimony in particular, one may wonder
why we need more than isomorphic matching, at least in the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1147
fpsyg-11-01147 June 1, 2020 Time: 18:6 # 8
Ryan and Gallagher Between Ecological Psychology and Enactivism
case of resonance between an agent and the environment, or
specifically with the music.
A purely isomorphic analysis runs into problems with its
focus on matching resonant patterns in cases where one-to-
one mapping is either impossible or not preferable. This may
be an artifact of focusing on perception in non-improvisational
settings, where one might claim a clear connection between the
invariant structures of the environment and the actions of an
organism. The worry may also be the result of the artificial
limitations of incorrectly focusing on the CNS-environment scale
(an isomorphism between brain and environment) instead of on
the agent-CNS scale (brain-body-environment).
One possible response to this concern is that the neural
patterns are only partially isomorphic patterns relevant for
action, rather than abstract or ideal isomorphic patterns.
After all, the patterns involved in resonance involve a rich
affordance landscape, laden as it is with a variety of meanings
for the organism. Thus, one may suggest that isomorphic
resonance is not about locking down static environmental
features but, instead, grasping patterns in the world through
perception, or enacting patterns in the world through action,
that ultimately allow agents to act on the rich, complex, and
dynamic environment.
Unfortunately, while not entirely inconsistent, some parts of
Fuchs’ analysis of isomorphic resonance in perception go against
this reading. For instance, after appealing to Herbert Dreyfus and
Charles Taylor on an Aristotelian view of the mind, Fuchs (2018)
claims:
the brain could be conceived as a matrix, which like the mind
is able to ‘receive all forms,’ that is to say, to take them over in
its own structure as neural patterns or potentials. In the actual
perception ‘mind and object become one,’ corresponding to an
encompassing resonant system state in which the same pattern or
form is activated in the brain as it is displayed by the object.” (p.
167, emphasis added).
In Aristotelian terms, the form of an object can be
distinguished from its matter, and it is the form (morphe) that
is replicated in neural patterns during perception. However,
accepting this Aristotelian idea runs into a problem concerning
exactly what it means to be isomorphic. What is the exact
isomorphism between the taste of a good wine and its correlated
neural state? Is the structural similarity of the isomorphism to
be taken at a first level of isomorphism (e.g., the brain resonates
with the invariant features for the taste of this particular wine)
or a higher-order (e.g., the brain resonates with the invariant
features of the experience of tasting this wine)? If taken in the
first level sense, what does it mean to resonate with the “taste”
of the wine? Indeed, which specific properties are actually being
resonated with in cases of perception, aesthetic or otherwise?
Since Fuchs account is supplemented by a theory of action and
gestalt completion, he may be able to provide direct answers to
such questions (e.g., the brain is resonating with the invariant
features of the wine as it hits the taste buds7). Someone who
only focuses on isomorphic resonance, in contrast, would be
7Thanks to one of the reviewers for raising this point.
unable to provide this more detailed account needed to explain
jazz performance.
This series of questions alone is not a reason to turn toward a
representational account of resonance. However, it does suggest
a need for having a more detailed account of resonance beyond
isomorphism. In a similar manner, since the representational
resonance account has a detailed way of answering these points,
we will begin with it before turning to a dynamical account.
A Need for Representations?
Facing an uncertain environment is often a main motivation
for positing representational accounts in the first place. In
the case of music perception, drawing on considerations from
both ecological psychology and Roger Shepard, we suggest that
Nussbaum (2007) account is one of the best developed of what
could be construed as representational resonance applied to the
case of music8. Before delving into the particulars of this account,
however, there is one immediate issue about his clearly stated
focus on an account of Western art music and its listeners (2007,
38-40) that needs to be addressed.
The worry here is that this account cannot be applied to jazz
ensemble performance without some serious modifications. We
grant that there is additional work, especially empirical in nature,
that needs to be conducted before we can say that Nussbaum’s
picture as given holds up well in the case of explaining jazz
performance and the perception that goes on in jazz musicians
during performance. Nevertheless, most of the basic tenets
underlying his theory can be applied without much reworking,
such as a particular role being placed on “acceptable” moves
during the development of solos that respect certain tonal, chord,
and key related constraints. While this focus on harmony does
not fully exhaust an account for all important aspects of jazz
performance, those extensions will be equally difficult for all
accounts of resonance to satisfy, and thus we shall not consider
them in more detail at the current moment.
Following Gibson’s definition of affordances, Nussbaum
suggests that the physical music itself can act as an external
representation for audience members and performers. It does
so by being a series of invariant relationships, i.e., musical
affordances, that are intertwined with motor and action responses
to the music. If this kind of external representation were the
only one in this account, it would be easily amenable to
dynamical accounts of resonance. Even the most radical non-
representationalist doesn’t claim that there are, strictly speaking,
no representations in any parts of human cognition. Language,
after all, is an essential part of different cognitive capacities and
an example of a representational system par excellence.
External representations, however, are not the only sorts of
representations for Nussbaum. He instead argues that musical
surfaces are “a carrier or vehicle from which information can be
extracted by performing appropriate transformational operations
that are supported by representations in the human mind-brain”
(2007, 23, emphasis added). These internal representations are
8Nussbaum is clear that his account is representational but he does not explicitly
consider it as a resonance-based account in the terms we have been exploring in
this essay. However, considering the role of resonance for Shepard, we believe
that this extrapolation is at least warranted as an analytical tool for our current
purposes.
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musical rules implemented in the motor system, similar in kind to
Chomsky’s (1965) rules in generative grammar and as developed
by Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) in the context of musical
meaning. More could be said about how this implementation
process operates, but the details are unnecessary to motivate the
main idea that internal representations are taken by Nussbaum as
a necessary part of explaining brain function.
On this account, the role of representations seems to be
even more important in improvised music because there is no
score to act as an external representation storage for the music.
Moreover, while the standard performance structure may set
basic parameters within which a musician must perform, there
remains a vast amount of possible decisions that a musician
could make. Thelonious Monk, for instance, was well known for
utilizing unconventional chord voicings during performance. His
selection of such chords may have been available in the music, but
it had to be interpreted and/or they had to be added to the piece in
some way. Such decisions are indicative of a certain ambiguity for
both how a jazz musician perceives the music and for how they
decide what to produce next. They also mirror well the discussion
of Shepard’s account from section Representational Resonance.
Speaking directly in regard to ambiguity in perception,
Nussbaum echoes Shepard and notes that “degraded and
ambiguous inputs immediately reveal the extent to which
information extraction depends on pattern completion, which
in turn requires internal representations and constructive
procedures that operate over these representations” (2007,
34). Instead of isomorphism, the suggestion here would be
that the better push is instead for complementarity between
brain and world. Such complementarity, in turn, may require
the brain to represent aspects of the world rather than to
isomorphically resonate with them. Resonant isomorphism may
beget either representationalism or non-representationalism; in
contrast, non-isomorphism would appear to require some sort of
complementary representationalism. The key question therefore
becomes do enactivist and ecological accounts of resonance
have the resources needed to explain the process of resonance
underlying jazz performance without appealing to these kinds of
complementary representations?
Based on these considerations, a representational resonance
account of jazz performance may be sketched as follows: assume
that a trumpet player is soloing during My Funny Valentine in a
trio consisting of her, a drummer, and a piano player. From years
of practice, the trumpet player has built up a rich store of internal
representations regarding her playing possibilities, including
an understanding of both rhythmic and tonal possibilities for
performance according to idioms in the musical language of jazz.
In this particular performance, she puts those representations to
use in order to address the combination of both the song structure
at hand as well as the performances of the rest of the group.
The uncertainty and openness of the performance space – the
particular chord phrasing of the piano or the subtle tempo shifts
of the drums – are supplemented by internal representations,
on this account, since the invariant features of the environment
alone are not enough to secure a successful performance.
Considering this brief account and the turn to
complementarity, the challenge for dynamical resonance
can be restated as whether it can offer a story of complementarity
without representations. Before turning to dynamic resonance,
a preliminary point to consider here contra Nussbaum would
be that his representational approach fails to acknowledge a
possibility for metastability within the brain that provides the
requisite flexibility, while not itself being a representational
phenomenon. The brain can move into multiple different stable
patterns of activation that are dependent on the specific dynamics
of the action in play. Boxers, for example, will deploy different
movements and fighting patterns depending on how close they
are to their opponent (Rietveld et al., 2018). In a similar way, jazz
musicians may choose to be more or less adventurous with their
soloing based on factors such as trust, experience, and audience
expectations. Such notions are not captured by the kinds of
internal representations that Nussbaum utilizes in his account.
While adventurousness is a broad concept, at the very least it
seems to be captured by the musician’s self-selection regarding
how much metastable behavior they engage in when listening
and performing. This metastability in behavior is further likely
to be supported by neural metastabilities such as those proposed
by Friston (1997).
Dynamical Resonance Returned
We currently have the following picture of dynamical resonance:
dynamical resonance provides an explanation of how an
organism picks up relevant environmental information, responds
to it as needed, and acts without any sort of representing by
the organism in any meaningful sense of the term. Enactivists
maintain that agents enact a world – that is, they enact
meaning - and this happens in a way that depends on a
dynamical-relational coupling of organism/agent-environment.
This enactivist view is fully consistent with an ecological
interpretation of affordances as relational – i.e., that affordances
are not agent-independent characteristics of the environment,
but define an agent-environment relation. Resonance thus
occurs in affordance-based responses to various aspects of the
environment in order to support actions.
On this picture, the environment, in contrast to the agent,
does not resonate with an organism. As described so far, the
environment is there existing as a constraint or partial constraint.
Understood this starkly, we are here faced with an issue: following
Raja, if resonance only occurs when the musician is tightly
constrained by an environmental variable, we run into a distinct
problem with the uncertainty of the environment coupled with
the flexible nature of improvised jazz performance.
This problem concerns the fact that even informationally
rich and invariant features of a jazz performance still leave a
wide latitude of possible choices for musicians. In other words,
a musician may resonate with parts of the sonic world during
a solo, yet their choices are not overly constrained by that
resonance process. They may even refuse processes of resonance
as much as become entrained by them.9 Part of Raja’s answer
to this issue may be cashed out in regards to both neural
reuse, which allows for a flexible engagement between an agent
9This is akin to the idea of habit breaking as found in improvised dance (see
Kronsted and Gallagher, in press).
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and their environment, and a role for behavioral dynamics
(Warren, 2006). We suggest that this move is an essential part
of responding to the worry. However, it leaves open whether
we should consider the cognitive explanation in this case to be
of different interrelated dynamical systems – the brain (where
neural reuse happens), the musician and the environment – or
one overarching dynamic system consisting of a single musician-
environment system. For the sake of space, we shall primarily
focus on the second reading here.
The latter interpretation of a single system runs into a
prima facie concern based on the idea that an environmental
variable must constrain the intraorganism scales. In short,
the single cognitive system interpretation may go against Raja
(2018) position that there’s a distinct environmental variable
constraining the organism. To clarify what we take the heart of
this worry to be, we are not concerned with the idea that the
environmental constraint may be overly restrictive of an agent’s
behavior, nor are we concerned that the focus on an ecological
variable keeps us stuck on the ecological level without giving
a proper explanation of the brain as resonant organ. Instead,
the issue is how to make principled sense of an environmental
variable if, as enactivists argue, cognition is fundamentally an
enacted improvisation among the co-performing aspects of the
brain, body, and world.
One response from ecological psychologists is to note that
the environment is not separate from the organism but,
instead, includes it (see Segundo-Ortin et al. (2019) for more
information). Another plausible option is that a co-performance
among these aspects doesn’t entail equal weight being distributed
among all of them at all times. Enactivists need not rule out the
idea that one factor may take the lead in certain circumstances.
Resonance may moreover require that, in certain cases, it would
make sense to talk about a variable ostensibly external to the
organism or agent constraining the actions (or operating as
boundary conditions on the dynamics) of the organism or
agent. Instead of necessarily treating all aspects of the cognitive
system as co-equals in the cognitive process, a proponent of
ecological psychology may argue that there is reason for at least
decomposing parts of the overall agent-environment system in
ways where the balance of power, so to speak, itself can vary from
circumstance to circumstance. Indeed, the appeal to enabling
constraints mentioned above may be a way of grounding this
sort of response.
Another important thing to note is that playing in a jazz
performance is not identical to tasks such as walking down
the street or moving furniture around the room.10 In enacting
a performance, a musician is not only resonating with several
different aspects of their environment, but, in addition, by
playing the music they are creating important parts of their
musical environment, capitalizing on musical affordances made
10If, as we propose here, jazz performance involves quick, close to immediate,
short-term resonance of the environment, rearranging furniture could support
a form of slow, long-term (perhaps more metaphorical, although nonetheless
material) resonance of the environment. Not only is it a rearrangement of
affordances, but one could say of a furnished room that it “really resonates” (i.e.,
metaphorically resonates) with its inhabitant. In popular parlance, one might say
that one “gets good vibes” from being in a particular environment.
by themselves and the other musicians. In this sense, the musical
(as well as the intersubjective/social) environment is resonating
with the performance. The self-tuning of the performer, or
group, important in Gibson’s account of resonance, is at the
same time a tuning of the environment. The other musicians
in the group, for example, also resonate with the performance
and with the music all of them are making together. Thus, we
suggest that a jazz performance is one where there is mutual,
looping resonances between the musicians, each other, and
various aspects of their environment, important parts of which
they are creating on the fly.
This mutual resonance points to what is missing from a
mistakenly strong reading of environmental information acting
as a unilateral constraint on human action. What is missing from
it is an account of how humans and other organisms can be
active forces that shape their environments. Since we can actively
construct or reorganize an environment to enhance resonance
processes, or to make the environment resonate with us, a full
account of resonance must explain this part of the process as
well, the importance of which is highlighted by theories of niche
construction in particular (Laland et al., 2016). Such alterations
of the environment can take place at quick timescales as well as
over the course of an individual’s lifetime (or multiple lifetimes, if
we are considering a species and not just individuals). While the
theory of neural reuse from Raja’s account does reference some
considerations about niche construction as it stands, it does not
yet explain how organisms actively modulate their niches and
the rest of the environment in real time.11 While making this
shift does not necessarily require a radical rethinking of core
tenants of ecological psychology, foregrounding a changing and
sometimes ambiguous environment is important if we are to
develop a full account of resonance moving forward, especially
for musical performance.
As an example of this real time environmental modulation
in jazz improvisation, consider how accompanying musicians
act as affordances for a soloist. The choice a bassist makes
between playing a walking bass line or a consistent pedal point
will impact the affordances available to a soloing sax player and
call for complimentary rather than isomorphic responses. At
the same time, the soloist acts as an affordance for the other
musicians, especially in the case of bebop and similar subgenres.
The individual and collective choices of the musician(s) in
such cases will have an immediate impact on the purportedly
constraining environmental variable. This impact both gives
at least a modicum of control to the performers to shape
the song and provides a much more dynamic environmental
variable (or set of variables) with which the musicians resonate
during performance.
More could also be said here about the nature of action
in jazz performance. Some cases or aspects of resonance may
be isomorphic, as Fuchs suggests. Other cases or aspects of
resonance will be non-isomorphic. In this regard, Fuchs is heavily
influenced by gestalt theories and the idea of pattern formation
11One can argue that the reuse principle extends beyond neural plasticity to
include “metaplasticity” (Malafouris, 2013), that is, the redeployment of artifacts,
environmental resources, economic and cultural practices that, intentionally or
unintentionally shape our cognitive and social practices (also see Gallagher, 2017).
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when it comes to explaining action plans and actions. In short,
during action, open loops between the environment and potential
neural couplings are completed by resonance processes that link
the environmental stimuli with planned action. In the case of
a jazz solo, the improviser will combine planned moves and
openness to the environment in order to properly resonate and
act accordingly to make their solo.
Furthermore, following Fuchs’ use of the notion of “kinetic
melodies” (which derives from Luria (1973) and has also been
developed by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011)), we can say that
a jazz improvisor will deploy various learned motor gestalts
and schemas to craft their particular improvisations. While
there may be times when a musician decides to be more or
less innovative and daring in their performance, any case of
improvising will still fall back on at least some basic motoric
components (e.g., a trumpet player must blow a certain way
to create a sound and a pianist needs to shape their hands in
certain ways to create chords). In a similar manner, following
suggestions from Love (2017) ecological description of jazz
improvisation, even highly skilled and creative jazz musicians,
repeat runs and phrases with fair amounts of regularity
during performance.
CONCLUSION
Although we have contrasted representationalist and non-
representationalist accounts of resonance, our intention was
not to enter into the representation war (Clark, 2015), or to
offer a full account of why one should be favored over the
other. That would be a different project that has been subject
to ongoing debate (see Downey, 2018; Williams, 2018). Rather,
our aim has been to understand and explore the concept of
resonance and its possible role in understanding the dynamical
processes of brain-body-environment, and to highlight some
problems and possible solutions in such an account. In this
respect we’ve considered issues pertaining to isomorphism versus
complimentarity, flexibility and agency, the weighting of system
factors, and the possible role of environmental rearrangement or
niche construction. These are issues that a dynamical resonance
account needs to continue addressing as it develops.
One final addition to round out the solution is to appeal
to the concept of attunement as either an addition or possible
replacement to resonance. For instance, in considering the notion
of resonance and its potential use in distributed cognition, Heft
(2001) argues that:
terms such as. . .resonance are useful moves forward in helping
us shed the dualistic trappings of inside/outside thinking. But at
the same time, they may handicap thinking in a different way, by
connotating a passive role for the individual relation. . .. Because
knowing processes are marked by an individual selectively
engaging the environment, a term with a more intentional
connotation may better direct the thinking here. In this
respect, attunement would seem to be more suitable (366,
emphasis in original).
Since all of the previous theorists discussed are aware of this
issue – especially if we include Gibson (1966) clarification that
the brain is able to self -tune, and not merely reacting like a
tuning fork excited by some soundwaves in the environment –
it may be better to see attunement and resonance as co-extensive
processes, rather than suggesting that we need to replace all uses
of resonance with attunement or that the notion of self-tuning
makes attunement somehow theoretically redundant.
There is likewise an important consideration regarding the
different senses of passivity that could be at play. For instance,
neither Fuchs nor Raja would argue that the brain, body, or
world are static and unchanging. Indeed, even within the brain,
and from single neurons all the way up to the whole brain,
both acknowledge and embrace the fact that the constellation of
neural activity evolves and develops over time, and this happens
as it attunes to changing environments. The environment is
likewise seen as integrally bound up with organisms instead of
separate from them.
As such, we suggest that a full dynamical account of jazz
performance will bring ecological resonance and enactive
attunement to bear at the same time, where differing
circumstances call for differing degrees of passivity and
activity. At the same time, we hasten to add that it would be a
mistake to think of the brain (or the organism, or the agent) as
shifting between resonance and attunement. It is instead the case
that the system is often in the process of doing both. The jazz
soloist we discussed above is both resonating and attuning at the
same time, after all, and we see no reason why that process would
be different in other areas of cognition.
The full and dynamical account of our jazz improvisation
case would therefore combine at least practices that involve
resonance, attunement, and niche construction. This dynamical
explanation offers a distinct story to tell regarding everything
from why a musician played a specific note instead of another
note, to how the entire ensemble can maintain their performance
together over time.
Although novelty and uniqueness may be important for our
everyday engagements, the general role of perception is not to
come up with unique interpretations of the environment, but
to properly orient us toward it. The same may be true for
part of improvisation, at least to the extent that perception of
what is already going on is needed while improvising. But such
close perceptual orientation to the world does not seem to be
true for all of improvisation. Likewise, while perception in jazz
performance requires similar sorts of resonance as perception in
other contexts – in order to perform, an improvising musician
must be attuned and responsive to what has been played and
is currently being played, just like someone walking down the
street must be attuned and responsive to what is happening
on the ground and around them – the jazz case goes beyond
them as well. Jazz improvisers often place a premium on novelty
and unique engagement with the environment, regardless of
whether they stay close or move far away from source material
during performance.
A continued engagement with this issue will require furthering
considerations about resonance and attunement processes for
agents acting in the world. We hope we have shown that we
can approach such issues with a stronger sense of how ecological
and enactive accounts of resonance resonate, and to what degree
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they hold in a fully developed account of music perception
and production in particular, and perception and action
in general.
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